Introduction
In the past few years, the international trade literature has examined the role of quality decisions in firm behavior, along with the associated implications for social welfare and trade policy.
Among the shortcomings of this literature are that it addresses competitive or monopolistic markets almost exclusively [with the exception of Das and Donnenfeld (1989) ], and that products are solely differentiated on the basis of quality.l
Prior models thus ignore the possibility that oligopolistic behavior may arise in those markets where successful entry requires the development of specific technological assets [or substantial sunk-cost investment].
Moreover. products in those markets may be differentiated on the basis of both horizontal [1. e.. brand] and vertical [1. e.. quality] attributes.
Consumers may hold diverse preferences for some of these attributes. but not for others. By allowing consumers to differ only in their valuation of quality. prior models discount the possibility that consumer diversity instead depends on other factors. When consumer diversity does not depend on varied prefereriees for quality. a firm still uses its quality choice to induce changes in consumer purchasing behavior and rival pricing behavior.
Hence, the quality decisions of firms have important welfare implications in these types of oligopolistic markets.
1
See Rodriguez (1979) . Falvey (1979 Falvey ( , 1983 Falvey ( ). (1980 . Mayer (1982) . Das and Donnenfeld (1987) . Donnenfeld (1988) . and Bond (1988) . 1 Santoni and Van Cott Krishna (1987 Krishna ( , 1990 . This paper considers these issues by analyzing a duopoly with one domestic and one foreign firm, where products possess both quality and brand attributes.
Consumers show similar preferences for quality but diverse preferences for brands. 2 ,3 This assumption may describe behavior in many markets. For instance, consumers may assign similar values to a product's "reliability", but have diverse preferences for its "styling".
Consumers in other markets may have similar incomes; hence, they may show similar tastes for the "luxury" of a product, but not for other attributes.
Using this assumption to describe tastes, we examine social welfare and optimal trade policy in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium where quality decisions are made before price decisions. In addition, firms may face "set-up" and "development" costs in improving product quality. We consider several types of interaction between policymakers and firms, and our results differ depending on the role played by set-up costs.
In the absence of set-up costs, private quality choices typically maximize social welfare unless a welfare maximum requires that a firm be constrained to a "minimal" presence in the market. If firms choose quality in anticipation of the policymaker's imposition of a subsidy or tariff, and if they possess perfect information concerning the policymaker's objectives, then .~elfare-maximizing quality levels are still selected.
This result may apply even when the policymaker's weighting of producer and 2 Das and Donnenfeld (1989) use a duopoly model where consumers are diversified in their preferences for the sole product attribute, quality. Product attributes are perfectly observable before purchase. Another strand of the literature examines trade policy when consumers face informational imperfections in observing quality [see Mayer (1982) , Bond (1984) , Donnenfeld, Weber, and Ben-Zion (1985) , Donnenfeld (1986) , Donnenfeld and Kayer (1987) , Falvey (1989) , and Bagwell and Staiger (1989) ]. consumer surplus differs from the "true" social welfare function.
Our conclusions change markedly, however, if there are informational imperfections in the market.
We find that in a situation where firms use their quality choices to signal cost information, the incentives created by signalling may cause either overcommitment or undercommitment to quality depending on the "receiver" of the signal. If a rival receives the cost signal prior to setting price, then a given firm sets its quality below the socially optimal level. This tendency may be reversed when the policymaker observes the cost signal prior to the imposition of a subSidy or tariff.
In the presence of set-up costs, firms typically choose suboptimal quality levels from a welfare-maximizing standpoint.
The foreign firm underinvests in quality whenever it is socially optimal for that firm to maintain a significant market presence. Yhen applied by itself, or in tandem with a uniform quality standard, we find that the optimal subsidy or tariff may be negative in sign. This result differs from policy recommendations contained in most price-setting models that ignore quality [e.g., Eaton and Grossman (1986) ].
Yhen quality decisions precede the imposition of a subsidy [or tariff), and the policymaker's objectives are known, the foreign firm still sets quality below the socially optimal level in the presence of set -up costs. The domestic firm, however, may overinvest in quality depending on the policymaker' s weighting of producer surplus, consumer surplus, and government revenue.
We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 describes the elements of the model. Section 3 examines an equilibrium where the policymaker may set a subsidy or tariff prior to the quality decision. If firms simultaneously choose locations prior to other stages of the game, then ~.ch firm reacts to its rival's locational choice by selecting that location which yields the highest expected payoff in the subsequent post-location subgame.
In the case of linear transportation costs, an assessment of this payoff is not without complications.
In particular, D'Aspremont, Jaskold-Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) have shown that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in prices may not exist when firms locate at close proximity.
Under these circumstances, some other equilibrium concept [possibly a mixed-strategy result] must be used to determine payoffs based on location. Salop (1979) and others have presumed that a symmetric locational equilibrium is relevant for examination.
Further, Economides (1984) has shown that our assumption of maximum firm separation conforms with a locational equilibrium in the case of quadratic transportation costs.
Our qualitative results are scarcely changed if ve convert to this assumption.
Since we measure distances in units of 211' radians, the circle is of unit circumference and the distance separating the firms equals 1/2. Prior literature has often assumed that quality is the only basis of product differentation, and that consumers show different preferences for quality.
Some of these models [see, for example, Das and Donnenfeld (1987, 1989) ] are based on the construct of Shaked and Sutton (1982) , where the marginal value of quality rises as a consumer's income increases.
In terms of this formulation, our specification can be justified if consumers have similar income levels.
This does not necessarily constitute an extreme assumption.
Even in industries such as automobiles, where there are "economy" and "luxury" varieties, the actual "markets" may essentially be stratified on the basis of consumer income [with little crossover purchasing] .
Alternatively, other markets may exist where consumers of 5 from any distance she must cover to reach a specific producer's location.
We characterize this loss as a "transport" cost that rises linearly with distance.
Our qualitative results would be unchanged fundamentally if we instead used a quadratic representation of transport costs.
Without losing generality, we assume that the price of the homogeneous good equals one, and the price of the differentiated domestic {foreign} good equals p(p*}.
To ensure that every consumer purchases one unit of the differentiated product, we only examine equilibria where
. Consumer w maximizes her utility by purchasing
. A consumer that is indifferent between the two varieties is located at distance x from the domestic firm, where
Hence, the market segment for the domestic(foreign} firm equals x{(1/2)-x} in each direction.
The domestic and foreign cost functions can be described as C(q,X) -c(q)X + f(q), C*(q*,X*) -c*(q*)X* + f*(q*),
where X{X*} is domestic (foreign) output, c(q)(c*(q*)} is domestic (foreign) marginal cost, and f(q)(f*(q*)} is non-output-related domestic{foreign} quality cost. We restrict the behavior of the cost functions and the consumer valuation of quality as follows:
An increase in quality potentially creates two sources of increased costs. different incomes share similar preferences for quality. Our construct parallels that used by Riordan (1986) to examine an incentive-compatible quality equilibrium under consistent consumer expectations. 6 First, as firms raise their quality input, their marginal production costs increase at a nondecreasing rate.
Second, an increase in quality may create costs that are not related directly to output [i. e., "set-up" and "development" costs]. In our future discussion, we say that "set-up" costs are absent(present} when fq,f*q* -{>} O. If these costs are present, we assume that they either increase or remain unchanged as quality increases.
Finally, an increase in quality raises the utility received by consumers, but at a decreasing rate.
Let Z(q) • h(q)-c(q) and Z*(q*) • h(q*)-c*(q*). Based on the above conditions, these functions are at least twice differentiable.
Zqq,Z*q*q* < O. We also assume the following:
Further,
The first inequality ensures that a quality level exists where the value of the product to consumers exceeds the cost of providing the product. The second inequality ensures that, at some quality levels, the marginal value of additional quality exceeds the marginal cost of providing that quality.
The third inequality ensures that the opposite situation prevails at some higher quality levels.
In an earlier stage, both firms have decided to enter the market based on their .expectation of nonnegative profits in the subsequent equilibrium. Given these entry decisions, our analysis examines a multistage game where firms determine the quality of their product prior to setting its price. We allow policymakers to impose trade policies at one of two possible stages: (1) 
Equations (2') and (2*') will prove useful to our analysis.
Ve only consider those cases where each firm has a positive market share in equilibrium. Letting x N refer to the equilibrium value of x, we thus assume that 0 < x N < 1/2.7 A unique Nash equilibrium in prices exists 6 Vithout losing generality, we normalize the marginal density function, few) -k, so that k -1.
7 This assumption excludes the possibility of a prohibitive import tariff or domestic tax.
Removing this assumption complicates the exposition while only minor modifications occur in our qualitative results. It also implies that a firm may have acted nonoptimally by deciding to enter the market.
In this model, the price and quality choices of a given firm are significantly different in the absence of entry than if a rival firm enters and serves a minute [or zero] share of the market. 8 based on the solutions to (2) and (2*).8
If we solve these equations simultaneously, the following equilibrium prices are derived:
By substituting these prices into equation (i), x N is also obtained:
Given that equations (3) and (3*) depend on q and q*, a firm can manipulate equilibrium prices through its quality choice:
It can be easily shown that a given firm's profits rise when its rival increases price. 9 Hence, quality is considered to possess positive{zero, negative} "strategic value" if increased quality input causes a rival's 8 It can be shown that each firm's profit function is continuous and concave with respect to its own price.
Reaction functions are thus continuous, and also linear with a positive slope.
Since the reaction functions are continuous, an equilibrium exists.
Given that they are linear, they satisfy a single-crossing condition.
Hence, the equilibrium is unique.
The equilibrium is also stable. By differentiating (2) and (2*), we obtain 1I' PP -1I'*p*p* --2/t < 0 and 1I'pp* -1I'*p*p -lit > O. Stability is established by observing that B -1I' pp 1l'*P*P* -1I'pp*1I'*p*p [-3/t 2 ] > O. 9 After substituting for x from (i), ve obtain 1I'p* -(l/t)[p-c(q)+s] and 1I'*p -(l/t)[p*-c*(q*)-v]. Each of these expressions is positive, since a profit-maximizing domesticCforeign) firm sets pCp*} > c(q) -s{c*(q*)+v} [see (2') and (2*')]. 9 price to rise{remain unchanged, fall}. Referring to equations (5) and (6), we now assess the "strategic value" of quality: Lemma 1. There exists q'E(g,q){q*'E(g*,q*)} that satisfies Zq{Z*q*} -O.
For the domestic{foreign} firm, increased quality input has negative[zero,positive] strategic value if q{q*} < [-,>] q'{q*').
Proof:
Consider the domestic firm. Given that Zqq is defined, Zq is continuous. By condition (ii), Zq(g) > 0 and Zq(q) < O.
Continuity thus
implies that Zq(q) -0 for some q E (g,q). Hence, q' exists.
From equation (5), we obtain dp*N /dq --Zq/3 ~ 0 i f Zq ~ 0 [where 
Using Lemma 2 and our prior assumptions, we can assert that ~qq and ~*q*q* exist. Hence, ~q and ~*q* are continuous functions.
In order to focus on .l.nternal equilibria, we assume that ~q(s,q*',s,v) > 0 and ~*q*(q',S*,s,v) > 0. 11 These conditions necessarily hold if fq(q)(f*q*(q*)}~O as q~g(q~g*}, a requirement that is always met in the absence of set-up costs.
Ve express the Nash equilibrium in qualities as (qN(S,V),q*N(S,V»,
10
The following shortcut is helpful. In equilibrium, the domestic {foreign} price must satisfy p-c(q)+s(p*-c*(q*)-v} -2tx N (2t«1/2)-x N )} [see equations (2') and (2*')].
Substituting these results into (1) and (1*), it follows that ~ -4t(xN)2 -f(q) and ~* -4t[(1/2)-x N ]2 -f*(q*). Equations (7) and (7*) can be obtained by differentiating these equations, using Lemma 2. and respectively denote the domestic and foreign reaction functions as qr(q*,s,v) and q*r (q,s,v) . Based on equations (7) and (7*), we obtain the following:
Lemma 3. Let fq,f*qw -O. Profit-maximizing behavior requires that qr(q*,s,v)(q*r(q,s,v)} -q'(q*'} for all q*{q). A unique Nash equilibrium occurs at (qN(S,v),q*N(s,v» -(q' ,q*'), where quality has zero strategic value.
Proof: Let fq -O. Equation (7) shows that ~q ~ 0 if Zq ~ 0, and we have previously shown that Zq ~ 0 if q ~ q'. Since ~q ~ 0 if q ~ q', the mean-
Hence, profit-maximizing behavior requires that qr (q*,s,v) q' for all q*.
By similar reasoning, q*r(q,s,v) -q*' for all q. Thus. (q',q*') is the unique Nash equilibrium; and, quality has zero strategic value in < (q' ,q*'), implying that quality has negative strategic value.
Proof: Let fq,f*q. > O. Equation (7) shows that ~q < 0 if Zq ~ 0, and we have previously shown that Zq ~ 0 if q ~ q'. Since ~q < 0 for q ~ q', and since 1!'qq is defined. continuity implies that there exists 5 (e) > 0 such that ~q < 0 for q > q'-5(e). It follows from the mean-value theorem s,v) for all q> q'-5(e). Hence, profitmaximizing behavior requires that qr(q*,s,v) ~ q'-5(e) < q'. Similarly, q*r(q,s,v) < q*'. Hence, any Nash equilibrium. requires that Since the quality behavior of each firm depends on the existence of set-up costs, the ability of policymakers to manipulate quality may also depend on these costs. When set-up costs are absent, each firm's quality choice is independent of its expected output level [as proxied by x N ].
Policymakers cannot alter quality choices by using instruments that merely change each firm's expectation of x
N •
When set-up costs are present, quality choices do depend on x N [since, from (7) and (7*), the optimal choices satisfy 4XN(Zq/3) -fq > 0 and 4( (1/2) _x
Given that the expected level of x N can be altered by changing a subsidy [or tariff] or a rival's quality choice, a policymaker can manipulate quality through a ~ariety of instruments.
Lemma 5. Consider a marginal increase from equilibrium in the quality of the low-quality firm. If fq,f*q. -{>} 0 {and if ""qq'''"*q*q* < 0 globally when fq,f*q* > O}, then: (i) the high-quality firm does not change{lowers}
12
Consider the domestic firm. From Lemma 4, qr(q*,s,v) must satisfy g < q [< q'l < q [since, by our pri~r assumption, ""q(g.q*,s,v) > 0 for any
Given that qr(q*, S, v) E (g, q), profit maximization requires that 1f q (qr(q*,s,v),q*,s,v) -0 and 1fqq < O. A similar result applies for the foreign firm.
13 its quality, (ii) profits remain unchanged(rise) for the low-quality firm, and (iii) profits remain unchanged(fall) for the high-quality firm.
Corollary. Let fq,f*q* -O. Any significant [I.e., nonmargina11 quality standard that is only binding for the low-quality firm will lower the profits of the low-quality firm and ~ the profits of the high-quality firm. Let fq,f*q* > O. A significant standard can be imposed that raises the profits of the low-quality firm and lowers the profits of the highquality firm.
Proof: See Appendix.
In Das and Donnenfeld (1989) [1. e., D&D], where consumers display heterogeneous preferences for quality and set-up costs equal zero, the imposition of a quality standard causes profits to rise for the low-quality firm and fall for the high-quality firm. In our model, when set-up costs equal zero, an imposed standard produces the opposite effect on profits.
When set-up costs are positive, the standard's impact on profits is qualitatively similar to that found in D&D [although the standard causes the high-quality .firm to l2.!!:n: its quality in our model and raise its quality in the D&D model].
Welfare and Quality
In this section and the next section, we consider welfare-maximizing 
or, using the definition of x,
Since the quality decisions determine the outcome of the Nash price subgame, we can substitute equations (3)- (4) into equation (8) . Partial differentiation with respect to domestic quality yields the following: (9) Further, we obtain the following by subtracting b1~q:14
This term indicates that a marginal increase in domestic quality benefits{harms} consumers if 13 Let B l , B 2 , and B3 represent the original weights attached to producer surplus, consumer surplus, and government revenue, respectively. Without affecting the maximization of the welfare function, we can normalize the original specification by dividing by B 3 .
This yields the specification in (8) [where b l -Bl/B3 and b 2 -B 2 /B 3 ].
14 When it maximizes ~, the domestic firm also maximizes b1~'
When q «» q', an increase in domestic quality results in lower(higher} prices to the l-2x N consumers of the foreign good [because dp*N/dq --(Zq/3) «» 0] and higher{lower} surplus to the 2x N consumers of
Consumer surplus thus reaches a maximum at q'. An increase in quality also affects tariff revenue and subsidy expenditures, as captured by the term, -«s+v)/t)(Zq/3). Using (9) and (10) Next, we turn to the welfare analysis of the foreign quality choice.
By partially differentiating the welfare function, we obtain:
Notice that foreign set-up costs do not influence price; hence, they do not appear in equation ( Consumer surplus thus reaches a maximum at q*'.
When q* < q*', an increase in foreign quality causes some consumers to divert their purchases to the foreign firm [since dxN/dq* --Z*q./6t < 0] . Given that the domestic price-cost differential is positive, this shift in demand creates an efficiency loss. This price-cost differential becomes larger as the domestic market share grows in equilibrium [since, from (2'), pN_C(q)+s -2tx N J. If the domestic market share is sufficiently large, then an increase in foreign quality may create losses for domestic producers that overwhelm the gains to domestic consumers. Due to this possibility, it is not always welfare-maximizing for the foreign firm to increase quality above its minimum level.
Proposition 2. I{. f*~ -(» 0, and if a welfare maximum requires a significant market presence, then the foreign firm sets quality at{below) the socially optimal level. 1S lS With a positive ad-valorem tariff [vadJ, the foreign firm sets its quality ~ the socially optimal level when f* -O.
The foreign firm chooses q*", which satisfies h*Q(q*) -(l+vad)c*~~*) -O. [Hence, a tariff increase leads to quality downaradina. J Although this quality choice maximizes consumer surplus, a marginal increase in quality would improve social welfare by raising price and boosting tariff revenue while leaving consumer surplus unaffected.
Under an ad-valorem tariff, the Remark.
Assume that free trade exists [i.e., s,v -OJ, and that producer and consumer surplus are equally weighted in the social welfare function.
If the foreign market share is less than 1/3 in equilibrium, then welfare can be increased by constraining the foreign firm to a minimal market presence.
Other models have noted that welfare may be improved by eliminating a firm from the market, or reducing its importance. 16 In general, output expansion by a less-efficient producer may reduce welfare by causing a contraction in the output of a more-efficient producer. The associated efficiency loss may overwhelm the consumer gain. When output is shifted from domestic to foreign firms, an efficiency loss necessarily occurs if price exceeds domestic marginal cost.
First-Best Policy and Other Alternatives
Under first-best policy, a benevolent policymaker maximizes social welfare by setting optimal levels for the domestic production subsidy, the import tariff, and for domestic and foreign quality. The quality of each firm can be adjus1;:ed either upward or downward from its privately chosen level.
To determine the optimal subsidy(tariff} under first-best policy, we partially differentiate V S with respect to s(v}:
domestic firm does set a socially optimal quality level when fq -O.
16
See Dixit (1986) , Schwartz (1988) , and Farrell and Shapiro (1990) .
Let B ,. 4b 1 + 2b 2 -6. We assume that W~s -Wev -(-1/18t)(6-B) < 0; hence, B < 6.
From (12) and (13) For any given quality pair, the welfare-maximizing subsidy-tariff combination satisfies the following:
If b z «-,» 1, the welfare effect from a given subsidy increase is inferior(equal,superior} to that from an equal tariff increase.
From the above results, it is apparent that s'+v' depends on the chosen values of q and q*. This functional relationship is crucial to the analysis in the next section, where firms recognize that their quality choices will infl~ence the subsequently imposed level of protection. In this section, the policymaker imposes her policies before quality is chosen.
Based on our prior results, we now derive the first-best policy combination:
Lemma 7. Let the maximization of social welfare require that each firm establish a significant market presence. If the conditions hold from Lemma 6, then first-best policy requires that: (i) q* -q*', (ii) q satisfy the first-order condition from (9) , and (iii) s and v satisfy (14).
Proposition 3. Let fq,f*q* -O. Private quality choices maximize social welfare under a first-best outcome; hence, no quality standards are needed.
Let fq,f*q* > 0 [and ~qq < 0 globally]. In order to attain a firstbest outcome, the policymaker imposes a standard on foreign quality. Given that all other policy instruments are at their optimal levels, the policymaker ad1usts domestic quality as follows: (i) The above result admits the possibility that welfare may be enhanced by using a standard to raise the quality of the low-quality firm.
Nonetheless, we h~ve only examined first-best policy where domestic and foreign quality levels can be adjusted individually.
In most cases, a uniform standard must be applied to all firms regardless of their nationality. In the Appendix [included in the proof of Proposition 3], we show that if set-up costs are positive. then imposing a uniform quality standard [in combination with an optimal subsidy and tariff] still raises welfare whenever the foreign firm is the low-quality firm. Moreover. if 20 the domestic firm is the low-quality firm. a uniform standard will raise welfare whenever b z > 1 and b 1 < 3/2. This conclusion contrasts with many results obtained in prior models [e.g., Das and Donnenfeld (1989) , where a uniform standard lowers welfare].
When the policymaker can only impose a uniform quality standard, or is constrained from imposing any quality standard, she still possesses policy tools that can alter the quality choices of an unconstrained firm.
For example, without any quality constraints, an increase in the subsidy or tariff raises domestic quality and lowers foreign quality when set-up costs are positive .17
The trade tax recommendations of previous price-setting models that ignore quality [e.g., Eaton and Grossman (1986) ] may be reversed when quality effects are considered. Prior models have often recommended imposing an import tariff for domestic markets, and a domestic production tax [i.e., export tax] for pure export markets. In addition to improving the terms of trade, an import tariff leads to gains in domestic efficiency when price exceeds marginal cost.
A domestic production tax causes domestic firms to raise their prices which, in turn, causes foreign rivals to raise their prices. This reaction by rivals enhances domestic profits in pure export markets.
17
This result presumes that the quality equilibrium is initially stable, which requires that Y • 1f1f*q*q* -1fqq*Pq*q > O.
By totally differentiating 1fq and 1f*q*' we obtain dq/ds -(-1f qa 1f*q*q* + 1f*q.s1f.)/Y and dq*/ds -(-1f*q* s 1f+ 1f qs 1f*q*q)JY. Further, 1fqa -(2/9t)Z , 1f*q*s --(2/9t)Z* *, and 1f* -1f*q*q --(2/9t)ZqZ*q*' Using Lemma 4, it follows that Zq(qft(s,v»,Z*q*(q-.N(S,v» > 0 i f fq,f*q* > O. Hence, under optimal behavior, 1fqs > 0, 1f*q*s < 0, 1fqq* -1f*q*q < 0, and as reqUired by secondorder conditions, 1f,1f*q*q* < O. It follows that dq/ds > 0 and dq*/ds < O.
Since 1fqs -1fqv and 1f*q*s -1f*q*v [because dxK/ds -dxlf/dv -1/6t], we can also assert that dq/dv -dqJds and dq*/dv -dq*/ds.
21
When set-up costs are positive in our model, the imposition of an import tariff lowers foreign quality which creates losses for domestic consumers.
The imposition of a domestic production tax raises foreign quality which creates losses for domestic producers in a pure export market. When these impacts are sufficiently large, we conclude as follows: 18 Remark.
Assume that foreign and domestic quality levels cannot be controlled individually, and both firms sell solely to the domestic market.
The welfare-maximizing policy may require an import subsidy [or domestic
For a pure-export market [where the foreign quality level cannot be directly controlled], the welfare-maximizing policy may require a domestic production subsidy.
The above results still apply when all components of social welfare are equally weighted.
Anticipated Ex-Post Trade Taxes or Subsidies
Let the policymaker impose tariffs or subsidies lliY quality is chosen, but befor~ the price -sett ing stage. This characterization of behavior may be particularly applicable when set-up and development costs are incurred in raising quality. If set-up costs increase significantly as the length of the set-up period collapses, then a substantial interval may arise between the quality-setting and price-setting stages. Firms are assumed to make their quality choices in anticipation of the subsequent
18
Formal proof available from author.
imposition of a subsidy and tariff. We also assume that both firms possess complete information concerning the policymaker's objective function.
By assumption, the policymaker's objective function [W P ] also consists of a positively weighted average of producer surplus, consumer surplus, and government revenue. This function is analagous to that used in equation (8), except that a 1 (a z ) replaces b 1 (b z ) as the weight for producer(consumer} surplus. We thus permit the policymaker's objectives to differ from "true" social objectives.
Solving by backward induction, we first derive the policymaker' s optimal subsidy-tariff combination [(s", v"») .
The policymaker maximizes her objective function after quality is chosen. The first-order conditions are thus identical to (12) and (13), except that a 1 (a Z } replaces b 1 {b z }.
Thus, the policymaker's optimal subsidy and tariff choices parallei those described in (14),
where A -4a 1 + 2a z -6, and k" -a z (3-2a z } if a z ~«) 1. We assume that A < 6 [i.e., 6-A> 0] in order to satisfy second-order conditions.
By substituting (4) into (15), and then totally differentiating, we assess the impact of a quality change on the policymaker's choices for a subsidy and tariff;
(16*)
A quality change by either firm can alter the policymaker's assessment of the domestic market share, which is proxied by xN(q,q*,s",v"). In response, the policymaker may adjust the total subSidy-tariff level [i.e., the level of protection). Since they possess complete knowledge of the policymaker's reaction function, both firms know that their quality choice will influence the subsidy-tariff level in a manner consistent with equations (16) and (16*).
In assessing the marginal value of its quality, the domestic firm now adds the term, lI's+v(d(s"+v")/dq), to equation (7 
Further, the marginal social value of domestic quality includes the welfare effect arising from the quality-induced change in the level of protection. We thus add the term, ~(ds"/dq) + W~(dv"/dq), to equation (9).
Using (15), we derive:
In evaluating the above expression, we use the following definition:
Definition. If the policymaker's objectives are socially consistent, then
When policy is socially consistent, the following results hold:
Since 11' -4t(XN)Z -f(q) in equilibrium [see footnote 10], and given that dxN/dv -dxN/ds -1/6t, we obtain 11'. -lI'v -(4/3)XN. Hence, we can refer to lI's+v' A similar result holds for the foreign firm. minimum at this quality level. This domestic quality choice maximizes both consumer and producer surplus, which implies that it is socially optimal.
When set-up costs are present, it is unlikely that the domestic firm chooses a socially optimal quality level under consistent policy. The domestic firm may even overinvest in quality, when producer surplus [and to a lesser extent, consumer surplus] carries a sufficiently large weight within the social welfare function. In this situation, the domestic firm has incentive to invest in quality for the purpose of raising the policymaker's assessment of its market share, which then induces the policymaker to raise the total level of protection.
If producer surplus carries a relatively small weight, the domestic firm will underinvest in quality.
Of course, with fully anticipated policy, the foreign firm can also use its quality choice to influence the applied level of protection. As the weighting of consumer and producer surplus increases in magnitude [i.e., as A increases in value], the foreign firm derives increased benefit from appearing able to capture a large share of the market. Remark '.
When f*q* ,., 0, the foreign firm can still set quality at the socially optimal level even if policy is socially inconsistent. This result necessarily occurs whenever 2b 2 + [(Ak' -6k")/(A-6)] > 0 [where
In this section, we see that firms continue to choose socially optimal quality levels in the absence of set-up costs. Moreover, they may still act optimally when the policymaker's objectives are socially inconsistent.
In the next section, we see that the signalling incentives arising from private information alter these conclusions. We search for a consistent, incentive-compatible, separating equilibrium where .the strategy used by the domestic firm uniquely reveals its cost "type". Thus, we posit that the optimal domestic strategy over all cost "types" can be described by a one-to-one mapping, g:
The mapping, y: Again, second-order conditions require that 6-A > O. Due to its impact on the subsidy-tariff level, a change in e exerts the following effect on domestic profits:
For the domestic firm, the policymaker can hold no vorse assessment than e -£(c) whenever A «» O. This belief would lead to the lowest imposed level of protection.
In a consistent, incentive-compatible, separatins equilibrium, the domestic firm must act optimally across all cost types. We require that g(c) -argmax q ~(y(q) ,c,c*,q,q*'(c*» for all c, noting that e _ y(q) .22
Consistency further requires that y(q) -g-l(q); hence, g-l(q_g(c» -c. 
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For notational convenience, we let (e,') refer to (e,q,q*). Hence, s"+v" is now dependent on e as well as q, and q*. The domestic firm sets a lower quality level as its costs increase.
Conversely, the policymaker's estimate of domestic costs increases as the observed quality level declines.
We are now able to assess the effect of incentive compatibility on the domestic firm's quality choice.
Since the domestic quality choice affects the policymaker' s assessment of its costs, the domestic firm's first-order condition becomes as follows [see Lemma 8J:
The term, [(1/(6-A»(4/3)x K ](6Z q ), follows directly from (17). The term, Using equation (20) and Lemma 9, we obtain 1I"e(dg- As the policymaker's assessment of domestic costs approaches the true cost level, the imposed subsidy-tariff combination approaches the welfaremaximizing combination [assuming policy is socially consistent]. Thus, if a change in domestic quality leads to a more accurate cost assessment by the policymaker, certain welfare benefits naturally arise. These benefits, however, may be overwhelmed by the negative impact on consumer surplus 32 resulting from the quality change.
Although the policymaker estimates domestic costs correctly when q -g(c), both consumer surplus and total welfare would rise if domestic quality moved closer to q'(c).
For the domestic firm, any incentive to overinvest in quality may be reversed when the foreign firm is incompletely informed. Consider a situation where neither firm can observe its rival's price but quality choices are observed prior to the price-setting stage. The foreign firm possesses incomplete information concerning domestic costs, but the domestic firm possesses complete information concerning foreign costs.
An incentive-compatible equilibrium is attainable where the foreign firm sets price at the Nash equilibrium level based on its expectation of rival costs, its own costs, and the observed quality choices. 24 Thus, the foreign price conforms with equation (3*), except that the foreign firm estimates domestic costs at e'q instead of cq for each unit of output. Let p*~(e',q,q*,s,v) refer to this foreign price. By replacing c(q) with e'q in equation (3*), and then differentiating, ve obtain dp~/de' -q/3 > O.
Since the foreign firm raises price when its estimate of domestic costs increases in magnitude, the domestic firm has incentive to raise the foreign firm's estimate of its costs. The domestic firm attempts to achieve this outco~e by lowering its quality, since de'/dq -dg-1/dq < 0 in a consistent, incentive-compatible equilibrium [see proof of Lemma 9] . Due to this behavior, we reach the following conclusion:
Proposition 7. Assume that fq,f*~ -0, g(c) is continuous everywhere, and a free-trade regime is in effect. Consider a consistent, incentive-
24
The domestic firm sets its price as a best response to this foreign price behavior. compatible separating equilibrium where the foreign firm is incompletely informed concerning domestic costs, and rival prices are not immediately observable.
Compared to the outcome under perfect information, the domestic firm sets lower quality. Furthermore, the domestic firm sets quality below the socially optimal level.
Concluding Remarks
In formulating trade policy for markets with quality aspects, the nature of diversity among consumers is crucial to any analysis. Although consumers exhibit different preferences for "brands" in our model, they exhibit uniform preferences for "quality". These assumptions yield results that differ markedly from those models where consumers exhibit diverse preferences for quality. In those models, the addition of quality is more valuable to certain types of consumers than others. This facet of consumer behavior implies that each firm can use its quality choice to gain an advantage in serving a specific part of the market. Hence, each firm attempts to set a different quality level than its rivals have chosen.
This outcome holds even if all firms face the same cost function in providing a product of a given quality.
In our mode.~, we eliminate the role of quality in determining a firm's "position" in the market, and instead let a firm's brand choice perform this function. 
Given the above behavior of v~, social welfare can attain a local [or global) maximum at only q ' ,g, or q [proof via mean-value theorem) . Of these choices, only q' is associated with a significant market presence. (12) and (13) 
From (7). we obtain 1!' q (qs.,) -(4/3)x N Z q -f q .
Substitute ~(qs.,) -0 into 1!'q(qa,'). When b 2 ~ 1 [and thus (b 2 -k') -0].
it follows that 1!'q (qS , ,) ia 0 if b 1 io 3/2. Given that profit-maximizing behavior requires that 1!'q(q,') -0, and that 1!'qq < 0, the private quality choice would be lower(equal,higher} than q8. When b 2 < 1 [and thus (b 2 -k')
Hence, the private quality choice would be higher than qS. When b 2 < 1 and b 1 < 3/2, the sign of 1!'q(qS,') depends on the magnitude of x N .
Suppose that the policymaker can only impose a uniform quality standard, and the domestic firm is the low-quality firm. Zq(dq*r/ds) [because dq*r/dq{dq*r/ds) --1I'*q*q/1I'*q*q*{-1I'*q*s/11'*q*q.} and 11'*q.q -Zq11'*q.s' given that 11'*q.q --(2/9t)ZqZ*q* and 1I'*q*s --(2/9t)Z*q*] .
By substituting the optimal subsidy-tariff combination [based on the modified f.o.c. from (12)] into the modified f.o.c. from (9) , it follows that the welfare-maximizing domestic quality choice must satisfy dWs(q,q*r(q,s',v'),s',v')/dq -2XNZq -b1f q -O. Let this condition be satisfied at qS. Since 1I' q -(4/3)x N Z q -f q , it follows that 11'q(qS,.) < 0 whenever b 1 < 3/2 and fq > O. Since 1I'q(q,.) -0 under profit-maximizing behavior, the domestic firm would choose less than the socially optimal quality level. Hence, a quality standard is needed.
Let the policymaker impose an optimal subsidy [and tariff], and a uniform standard that only constrains the [low-quality] foreign firm. The welfare-maximizing policy combination must satisfy the f.o.c.'s from (11) and (12)[ (13) v~ .. is again expressed by (11). vhere s"(,)+v"(,) -t[Bxl'f(q.q*,S"(,) ,v"('»+k"J.
Substituting, we obtain V~* -[_2xN + (1/3)(2b 2 +k") JZ*q*' Since (1/3)(2b 2 +k tl ) ~ 1 '[because b 2 +k" -3b 2 (3) if b 2 ~«) lJ and 0 < 2x N < 1, it follows that V~* ~ 0 if Z*q* ~ O. Given that Z*q* ~ 0 if q* ~ q*', social welfare reaches a maximum at q*'.
To assess the marginal private value of its quality, the foreign firm now adds ~*s+v(d(stl (' )+v" (') )/dq*) -[B/(6-B) J 4«1/2) -x N )(Z*q*/3) to (7*).
It follows that ~*q* -[6/(6-B)J4«1/2)-x N )(Z*q*/3) -f*q*' Let f*q* -O.
Once again, ~*q* ~ 0 if Z*q* ~ 0 [noting that B < 6). Hence, foreign profits reach a maximum at q*'. The private quality choice is socially optimal.
Let f*q* > O. Referring to ~*q*' and using reasoning analagous 41 to that in the proof of Lemma 4, it follows that q*r(q,') < q*' for all q.
The foreign firm sets quality below the social optimum.
When policy is inconsistent, A ~ B. To assess V~., we add the term, W~(ds"C)/dq*) + V~(dv"C)/dq*) to the specification in (11) , where W~{V~} is expressed by (12){(13)} and d(s"C)+v"C»/dq* is expressed by (16) [noting that ds"C)/dq*(dv"C)/dq*} -0 i f a 2 «~) 1 --refer to (14) be satisfied unless 1f eq (dg/dc) > 0, which requires that dg/dc has the same sign as 1f cq ' By differentiation, 1fcq --(4/3(6-A»)[6x N +(qZq/t»). As c~cw, g(c)~q'(CW) which implies that Zq~O. Hence, 1fcq ~ -(4/3) [6/(6-A»)x N < 0 as c~cw; it follows that dg/dc < 0 near cwo Kailath (1987) shows that g(c) is continuous, and also monotonic, above results into the specification for dWs/dq, and then subtract b I (d1!"/dq). welfare maximum [and also global maximum, since d1r/dq > 0 implies that dW s /dq -b I (d1r/dq) > 0 for q :$ g(c) J is attained by raising domestic quality from g(c). QED
